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INTRODUCTION
With President Reagan’s formal apology and reparation
payments in 1988 to Japanese-Americans who were interned
during World War II,1 many felt that a troublesome chapter in
* J.D. Candidate 2007, Chapman University School of Law; B.A. 2003, University of
California, Berkeley. I would like to thank Professor Celestine McConville for her invaluable comments on drafts of this comment. This comment is dedicated to my father and
mother, Dr. Mohammad R. Safarzadeh and Simin Badeii, who made immeasurable sacrifices for their children's education.
1 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4 (2000).
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United States history had closed. After Pearl Harbor was attacked on December 7, 1941, approximately 120,000 American
citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from
their homes on the West Coast.2 They were gathered at assembly
centers and relocated to internment camps throughout the country.3 The internment of Japanese-Americans was immediately
condemned by legal scholars as “the worst blow our liberties have
sustained in many years.”4 Although internment was a drastic
measure, many believed that it was an anomalous response to a
catastrophic attack that could not happen again.
The events of September 11, 2001 shattered the sense of security that Americans had enjoyed for several decades. For the
first time since Pearl Harbor was invaded sixty years earlier,
there was an attack on American soil that cost thousands of lives.
President Bush and Congress reacted to the attacks with swift
military action5 and new domestic security laws.6 In the ensuing
years, several lawsuits challenged the constitutionality of those
measures before the Supreme Court.7
Historically, the Supreme Court has responded to the President’s wartime actions in two ways. At times, the Court has used
a deferential balancing model to weigh the President’s assertion
of wartime necessity against the protection of civil liberties.8
Under this model, the Court interprets constitutional principles
broadly to allow presidential actions during wartime that it
would find unconstitutional in peacetime.9 The Court limits the
role of judicial review by refusing to examine the reasonableness
of the President’s actions.10 Advocates of the deferential balancing model argue that the Court should not interfere with the
President’s protection of national security during temporary wartime periods.11 However, critics of the model assert that the
2 TETSUDEN
KASHIMA, JUDGMENT WITHOUT TRIAL: JAPANESE AMERICAN
IMPRISONMENT DURING WORLD WAR II, at 4 (2003).
3 Id.
4 Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489,
490 (1945).
5 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224
(2001).
6 See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (2001).
7 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004).
8 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944).
9 Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1059 (2003). Gross calls this model “interpretive accommodation.”
10 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“In adjudging the military
action taken . . . it is necessary only that the action have some reasonable relation to the
removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage.”).
11 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV.
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Court’s failure to scrutinize presidential policies has allowed
policies based on animosity toward unpopular groups to be justified as national security measures.12
At other times, the Court has responded to the President’s
wartime actions by invoking justiciability doctrines to avoid addressing the merits of a particular issue until the emergency has
subsided.13 Under the justiciability doctrines model, the Court
applies procedural grounds like the political question doctrine
and standing to avoid establishing a precedent that would condone constitutional violations.14 Supporters of the justiciability
doctrines model argue that the Court should not demand that
military policies conform to constitutional principles when they
are needed to protect the country.15 Some measures essential to
winning a war may be unconstitutional.16 Those supporters be605, 627 (2003).
12 Rostow, supra note 4, at 491. Rostow states that in Korematsu, the Court “upheld
an act of military power without a factual record in which the justification for the act was
analyzed.” Id. See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“A military judgment based upon such racial and sociological considerations is not entitled to the
great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon strictly military considerations.”).
13 See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
14 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 606 n.1.
15 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 244–45 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Justice Jackson explains
the justification for the justiciability doctrines model as follows:
It would be impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that
each specific military command in an area of probable operations will conform
to conventional tests of constitutionality. When an area is so beset that it must
be put under military control at all, the paramount consideration is that its
measures be successful, rather than legal. The armed services must protect a
society, not merely its Constitution. . . . No court can require such a commander in such circumstances to act as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting. . . .
....
In the very nature of things, military decisions are not susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made
on information that often would not be admissible and on assumptions that
could not be proved. . . . Hence courts can never have any real alternative to
accepting the mere declaration of the authority that issued the order that it
was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint.
Id.

16 Id. at 245–46. Jackson argues that the internment of Japanese-Americans is a
violation of civil liberties. However, the Court’s decision upholding the internment under
the Constitution was much worse than the internment order itself:
Much is said of the danger to liberty from the Army program for deporting
and detaining these citizens of Japanese extraction. But a judicial construction
of the due process clause that will sustain this order is a far more subtle blow
to liberty than the promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military emergency. . . . But
once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
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lieve that the Court should not exercise judicial review to validate a policy that is necessary, but clearly unconstitutional.17
However, critics of the justiciability doctrines model argue that
by failing to hear cases during wartime, the Court avoids its constitutionally-mandated duty to protect citizens’ rights.18
The major problem with both models, however, is that they
are inconsistent with the Founding Fathers’ beliefs.19 The Framers passionately believed that the President and Congress could
not ignore constitutional principles.20 They established a Supreme Court with a constitutionally-mandated duty to prevent
oppressive government actions passed in times of war and hysteria.21 The Founders believed that a plea of military necessity
should not be used to violate fundamental constitutional rights.22
Counterbalancing the Founders’ strict adherence to protecting constitutional rights was their belief that national security
was extremely important.23 The Court has often failed to take
this into account by inflexibly interpreting the Constitution.24
The Founding Fathers believed that the President should have
sufficient power to protect the nation against foreign attacks,25
but the Court’s unduly restrictive interpretation can prevent the
President from defending against sudden attacks.26 During imAmerican citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.
Id.

Id. at 244–46.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 469 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (“[T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments . . . .”).
19 Id. at 470 (“Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled
or changed the established form, [the Constitution] is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.”).
20 Id.
21 See id. (“[I]t is easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude
in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative
invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.”).
22 See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 69–70.
23 THE FEDERALIST NO. 41 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 256 (“Security against
foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential
object of the American Union.”).
24 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148–50 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487)
(holding that even in times of war, the President does not have the power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus).
25 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423 (“Energy in
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to
the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”).
26 See, e.g., Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149. Justice Taney inflexibly interprets the
Constitution during the Civil War. In response to imminent danger that Confederate
forces would invade Washington, D.C., President Lincoln ordered General Cadwalader to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. He did not get permission from Congress before doing
so. In Merryman, Justice Taney harshly criticized President Lincoln for unilaterally sus17
18
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minent threats to national security, constitutional principles
must be tempered by the President’s need to protect the nation.
This comment advocates the balancing test with bite model,
which the Court adopted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.27 This model is
most consistent with the Founding Fathers’ views because it provides all three branches with important roles during wartime.28
The Court in Hamdi exercised its constitutionally-mandated duty
to judicially review the President’s wartime actions.29 It also
demanded evidence to support a citizen’s detention,30 while accommodating the military’s needs by lowering its evidentiary
burden.31 At the same time, however, the Court balanced its protection of citizens’ rights with the President’s interest in conducting the war by reaffirming the holding in Ex parte Quirin, which
allows the President to detain even American citizens designated
as enemy combatants.32
Part I of this comment explores how the Supreme Court historically has responded to the President’s wartime actions. Part
II explains the Founding Fathers’ belief in constitutional absolutism and the Supreme Court’s duty to protect citizens’ rights.
Part III argues that the Court has applied constitutional absolutism inconsistently with the Founders’ wishes by unduly burdening the President’s power to protect national security during wartime. Part IV advocates the balancing test with bite model and
shows that it is most effective at simultaneously defending national security and protecting constitutional rights.

pending the writ of habeas corpus:
With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language too clear to
be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatever for supposing that
the president, in any emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize the
suspension of the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the judicial power.
Id.
27 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647–48 (2004) (holding that an individual
detainee’s interest in due process must be balanced against the government’s interest in
protecting national security).
28 Id. at 2650 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are
at stake.”).
29 Id. (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”).
30 Id. at 2651 (“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”).
31 Id. at 2649 (“[E]nemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”).
32 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942).
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I. THE SUPREME COURT’S WARTIME RESPONSES TO
PRESIDENTIAL ACTIONS
Historically, the Supreme Court has responded to the President’s wartime actions by following one of two models: the deferential balancing model33 or the justiciability doctrines model.34
Under the deferential balancing model, the Court examines the
reasonableness of the President’s actions in a highly deferential
manner, allowing infringement of citizens’ rights.35 Likewise,
under the justiciability doctrines model, the Court avoids reviewing presidential actions so that a harmful judicial precedent is
not established.36 Both models severely restrict the wartime role
of judicial review in protecting citizens’ constitutional rights.37
A. The Deferential Balancing Model
Under the deferential balancing model, the Supreme Court
defers to the President’s determination that his policies strike
the proper balance between defending national security and protecting civil liberties during wartime.38 Constitutional rights
normally provided during peacetime are outweighed by the
President’s need to conduct the war effort.39 Scholars who defend
the deferential balancing model argue that the Court’s defense of
constitutional rights during wartime will unduly burden the
33 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) (“[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there
were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.” (quoting Hirabayshi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99
(1943))).
34 See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (“Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered
to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to the
first count if we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew
order, must be sustained.”).
35 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[N]o reasonable relation to
an ‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ public danger is evident to support this racial
restriction which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional
rights in the history of this nation . . . .” (quoting United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 623, 628 (1872))).
36 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85.
37 This is particularly problematic because an independent judiciary was specifically
intended to protect the constitutional rights of individuals without being swayed by popular opinion. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469
(“This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the
rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men,
or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.”).
38 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218.
39 Gross, supra note 9, at 1034 (“Judges . . . are sensitive to the criticism that they
impede the war effort. Thus, in states of emergency, national courts assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review governmental actions and decisions.”).
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President’s protection of national security.40 However, critics of
the model argue that the Court should review the reasonableness
of the President’s actions without such deference to determine
whether the cost of infringing citizens’ rights outweighs national
security objectives.41
The Court adopted the deferential balancing model in Korematsu v. United States42 in response to President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066, which authorized General J.L. DeWitt to intern Japanese-Americans during World War II.43 After President
Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, General DeWitt issued
Public Proclamation No. 1, which designated security areas from
which Japanese residents should be removed.44 In Korematsu,
the Court upheld the internment order, reasoning that “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities
and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number and strength could not be precisely and
quickly ascertained.”45 Although no Japanese resident was ever
charged with espionage,46 the Court refused to examine the reasons behind General DeWitt’s internment order.47 The Court determined that the President’s national security measures outweighed citizens’ due process rights.48
Scholars who defend the deferential balancing model argue
that vigorous judicial review during wartime unduly burdens the
President’s defense of national security.49 They observe that
“[t]he characteristics of judicial review—deliberation, openness,
independence, distance, slowness—may be minor costs, and
sometimes virtues, during normal times; but during emergencies
40 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 627 (“The characteristics of judicial review—deliberation, openness, independence, distance, slowness—may be minor costs, and
sometimes virtues, during normal times; but during emergencies they can be intolerable.”).
41 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Justice Murphy
applies no such deference in his dissent, stating, “In adjudging the military action . . . it is
necessary only that the action have some reasonable relation to the removal of the dangers of invasion, sabotage and espionage. But the exclusion . . . of all persons with Japanese blood . . . has no such reasonable relation.” Id.
42 Id. at 217–19.
43 Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092–93 (1942).
44 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 86 (1943).
45 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (quoting Hirabayshi v. United States, 323 U.S. 81, 99
(1943)).
46 Sharon Boswell & Lorraine McConaghy, Abundant Dreams Diverted, SEATTLE
DAILY TIMES, June 23, 1996, at B2.
47 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that no reasonable relation existed between the exclusion order and the removal of danger).
48 Id. at 219–20 (majority opinion) (“Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens
from their homes . . . is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions. But
when . . . our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.”).
49 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 627.
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they can be intolerable.”50 The Court’s examination of wartime
actions can interfere with military operations in foreign countries
by requiring soldiers to gather evidence about detainees.51 Furthermore, the openness of court proceedings may allow national
security secrets that could harm the military to be released.52
Military officials should be given wide latitude to protect national
security during wartime without judicial intervention.53
Advocates of the deferential balancing model also argue that
the temporary hardships of war justify policies that should not be
permitted during peacetime.54 As Justice Frankfurter observed
in his concurring opinion in Korematsu, “action is not to be stigmatized as lawless because like action in times of peace would be
lawless.”55 Constitutional principles should be somewhat relaxed
during a temporary wartime emergency.56 Scholars have noted
that “[a]lthough deference also permits the executive to violate
rights, violations that are intolerable during normal times become tolerable when the stakes are higher.”57 The President’s
protection against imminent attacks may be unduly restricted by
a court that rigidly interprets the Constitution without regard to
legitimate national security concerns.58
Critics of the deferential balancing model respond that by refusing to examine the President’s policies, the Court allows citizens’ constitutional rights to be violated for reasons unrelated to
national security.59 In Korematsu, for example, the Court igId.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 470 (2003) (“The military has been charged by
Congress and the executive with winning a war, not prevailing in a possible court case.”),
vacated, 542 U.S. 507.
52 John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
427, 448 (2003) (“A habeas proceeding could become the forum for recalling commanders
and intelligence operatives from the field into open court; disrupting overt and covert operations; revealing successful military tactics and methods; and forcing the military to
shape its activities to the demands of the judicial process.”).
53 Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 474 (“Article III courts are ill-positioned to police the military’s distinction between those in the arena of combat who should be detained and those
who should not.”).
54 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
55 Id.
56 Gross, supra note 9, at 1059 (“[T]he need for additional powers to fend off a dangerous threat is accommodated by an expansive, emergency-minded interpretive spin on
existing norms through which various components of the ordinary legal system are transformed into counter-emergency facilitating norms.”).
57 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 609.
58 Gross, supra note 9, at 1044 (“When faced with serious threats to the life of the
nation, government will take whatever measures it deems necessary to abate the crisis.”).
59 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“[N]o reasonable
relation to an ‘immediate, imminent, and impending’ public danger is evident to support
this racial restriction which is one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional rights in the history of this nation . . . .” (quoting United States v. Russell, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 628 (1872))).
50
51
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nored the fact that General DeWitt, the military commander who
ordered the internment of Japanese residents from the West
Coast, had animosity toward the Japanese.60 As Justice Murphy
observed in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu, General DeWitt
testified before Congress that “I don’t want any of them [persons
of Japanese ancestry] here. . . . It makes no difference whether
he is an American citizen, he is still a Japanese. . . . [W]e must
worry about the Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the
map.”61
The Court’s failure to consider General DeWitt’s reasons for
the internment order allowed a policy motivated by hostility toward a racial group to be disguised as a national security measure.62 As Justice Murphy observed, “A military judgment based
upon such racial and sociological considerations is not entitled to
the great weight ordinarily given the judgments based upon
strictly military considerations.”63 During wartime, where a racial or politically unpopular group is often targeted, the Court
should be especially vigilant in protecting civil liberties.64
B. The Justiciability Doctrines Model
Under the justiciability doctrines model, the Court prevents
the establishment of a judicial precedent sanctioning constitutional violations by failing to address the merits of a case or an
issue.65 The Court uses the doctrines of standing and political
question to avoid reviewing the constitutionality of the President’s policies.66 By refusing to hear a case, the Court does not
interfere with the military’s prosecution of a war and does not
constitutionally challenge the President’s policies.67

Id. at 236 n.2.
Id.
CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 50 (expanded ed. 1976) (Justice Murphy “had apparently bothered to read the military and congressional reports on the evacuation, and had been shocked by the evidences of naked
prejudice that ran like angry veins of poison through its entire history.”).
63 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 239–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
64 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 672 (2d
ed. 2002) (“[T]he Constitution and the Court’s role are most important precisely in such
times when pressure and even hysteria to violate rights and discriminate will be most
likely to occur.”).
65 See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.”).
66 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 606 n.1 (“[T]he expansion of executive
power is accepted but not explicitly acknowledged, and courts . . . do and should exercise
deference surreptitiously, by ducking legal challenges with the help of the copious procedural mechanisms at their disposal—standing doctrine, denial of certiorari, delay, and so
forth.”).
67 Id.
60
61
62
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The Court applied the justiciability doctrines model in Hirabayashi v. United States, a case challenging both the curfew and
internment orders against Japanese-Americans during World
War II.68 Gordon Hirabayashi was charged with violating the internment order and failing to comply with the curfew order.69
The district court ordered him to serve a concurrent sentence of
three months for both counts.70 The Court used the concurrent
sentence doctrine to avoid deciding the constitutionality of the internment order.71 Under this doctrine, if an appellate court can
affirm a conviction on one count, it does not need to hear a challenge to a second count if the second count’s sentence is equal to
or less than the first count.72 The Supreme Court upheld the curfew order and avoided addressing the internment order:
Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it
will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to
the first count if we find that the conviction on the second count,
for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.73
The Court easily upheld the curfew order, as Hirabayashi
himself admitted that it was a reasonable wartime measure.74
The Court reasoned that “it is enough that circumstances within
the knowledge of those charged with the responsibility for maintaining the national defense afforded a rational basis for the decision which they made.”75 As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed
in his book on the subject:
In Hirabayashi . . . the Court could have decided the validity of
both the relocation requirement and the curfew requirement. The
“concurrent sentence” doctrine under which the Court declined to do
so is not mandatory but discretionary. But counseling against any
broader decision was the well-established rule that the Court should
avoid deciding constitutional questions if it is possible to do so.76

By using the concurrent sentence doctrine, the Court in Hirabayashi avoided review of the controversial internment order.77
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943).
Id. at 83.
Id. at 85.
See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME
205 (1998).
72 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 310 (8th ed. 2004).
73 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85.
74 Id. at 99.
75 Id. at 102.
76 REHNQUIST, supra note 71, at 205.
77 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85 (“Since the sentences of three months each imposed
by the district court on the two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider questions raised with respect to the first count if we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the curfew order, must be sustained.”).
68
69
70
71
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The curfew order requiring citizens to remain in their homes after 8:00 p.m. was a much lighter restriction on civil rights than
the internment order forcing citizens to be removed from their
homes, sell their personal belongings, and relocate to internment
camps.78 The Court avoided establishing a legal precedent that
validated the internment order until a year and a half later in
Korematsu.79
In Korematsu, Justice Jackson defended the justiciability
doctrines model in his dissenting opinion.80 Although Jackson
observed that the internment order singling out Japanese residents was both over-inclusive and under-inclusive, he reluctantly
noted that it is more important that military measures be successful than legal.81 He then presented the rationale for the justiciability doctrines model:
[C]ourts can never have any real alternative to accepting the mere
declaration of the authority that issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint. . . . A military commander
may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.
But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.82

Justice Jackson argued that military decisions should not be
subject to judicial standards that might sacrifice the war effort.83
The military emergency of the time may warrant drastic, legally
questionable actions by the President.84 A judicial precedent approving such policies, however, could be used in times that do not
warrant such action.85 Thus, the Court should refuse to hear
challenges to the President’s policies to prevent the establishment of a harmful judicial precedent.86
Scholars have asserted two major critiques of the justiciabil78 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225–26 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(“This is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night as was Hirabayashi . . . . it is
[a] case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a
concentration camp.”).
79 Id. at 219.
80 Id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
81 Id. at 244.
82 Id. at 245–46.
83 Id. at 244 (“No court can require such a commander in such circumstances to act
as a reasonable man; he may be unreasonably cautious and exacting.”).
84 Id. at 246 (“A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer
than the military emergency.”).
85 Id. (“But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of racial
discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can
bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.”).
86 Id.
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ity doctrines model. First, critics have challenged Justice Jackson’s argument that wartime precedents will be used to sanction
abuses during normal times.87 They assert:
Why must the precedent both (1) spill over into ordinary law and
(2) remain entrenched ‘for all time,’ as Jackson puts it? As for the
first condition, the precedent will itself have a built-in limitation to
emergency circumstances. . . .
....
As for the second condition, . . . . [s]tare decisis will be either
strong or weak. If it is weak, then past precedents granting emergency powers can be overruled . . . .88

According to these critics, Justice Jackson incorrectly assumes that wartime measures validated by the Court will be
used during normal times.89 The Court can restrict the precedent’s application to similar wartime emergencies.90 The Court
can also refuse to extend a precedent to a situation that does not
warrant similar deference.91
A second criticism of the justiciability doctrines model is the
normative argument that the Supreme Court has an affirmative
duty to prevent constitutional violations.92 As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, “the very essence of civil
liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws.”93 With lifetime tenure and guaranteed salaries, federal judges are in a unique position to vindicate
the constitutional rights of racially and politically unpopular
groups during times of hysteria.94 The Court’s use of justiciability doctrines effectively ignores constitutional violations.
II. THE FOUNDING FATHERS’ BELIEFS
The primary reason that the Court should avoid applying the
deferential balancing model and the justiciability doctrines model
is that both models are inconsistent with the Founding Fathers’
See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 11, at 615–16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 615 (“[L]ater judges may either distend the precedent to accommodate government power or else contract the precedent to constrain it.”).
91 Id.
92 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469.
93 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
94 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469.
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges
which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
Id.
87
88
89
90
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beliefs.95 The Framers adopted a written Constitution to establish certain fundamental rights that are immune from actions by
the President and Congress.96 They believed that the role of the
Supreme Court is to protect citizens’ fundamental civil rights
during both wartime and peacetime.97 The President and military officials cannot use a plea of military necessity to violate
fundamental constitutional rights.98
A. The Constitution’s Supremacy over Ordinary Acts
By creating the Constitution, the Founders intended to establish certain fundamental rights that a political majority could
not easily change.99 Unless it is amended, the Constitution’s
provisions are superior to all contrary presidential and congressional acts.100 Alexander Hamilton declared in The Federalist
No. 78, “Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative
act, annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their
representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.”101
The Founding Fathers worried that a tyrannical majority would
unite to deprive other citizens of their rights.102 Thus, they pro95 Id. at 470 (The Constitution “is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as
individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant
their representatives in a departure from it.”).
96 Id.
97 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 120–21 (1866). The Court in Milligan embraced
constitutional absolutism:
Those great and good men [Founding Fathers] foresaw that troublous
times would arise, when rules and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed
just and proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in
peril, unless established by irrepealable law. . . . The Constitution of the
United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and
covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences,
was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine
leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it
is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence . . . .
Id.
98 Id. at 121, 123.
99 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 467 (“No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid.”).
100 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . . . .”).
101 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 470.
102 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 18, at 80 (“When a majority
is included in a faction, the form of popular government . . . enables it to sacrifice to its
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens.”).
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posed and ratified a written Constitution to grant all citizens basic protections that cannot be denied by the political branches of
government.103
Justice Marshall reaffirmed the Constitution’s supremacy
over acts of the President and Congress in Marbury v. Madison.104 There, Justice Marshall argued that the theory behind
written constitutions is to establish certain fundamental, unalterable principles:
The [C]onstitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts,
and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. . . .
....
[I]f the latter part be true, then written constitutions are absurd
attempts, on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature
illimitable. . . .
....
[I]t thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions—a written constitution.105

Justice Marshall argued that measures passed by Congress
and the President cannot be given the same weight as constitutional provisions.106 The Constitution’s fundamental principles
must remain superior to the temporary decisions of political majorities.107
The Founders feared that leaders could use the fear of foreign attacks to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights.108
In The Federalist No. 8, Alexander Hamilton contrasts countries
forced to maintain standing armies to defend against frequent
invasions with those that have small militaries.109 He warns of
103 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469 (“[Y]et it is
not to be inferred from this principle [that the Constitution can be amended] that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a
majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions.”).
104 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 180 (1803) (observing that the Constitution is the “supreme
law of the land,” and that only the laws of the United States “made in pursuance of the
[C]onstitution” are valid).
105 Id. at 177–78 (emphasis added).
106 Id. at 176–77 (“The distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited
powers, is abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed,
and if acts prohibited and acts allowed, are of equal obligation.”).
107 Id. at 177 (“[A]n act of the legislature, repugnant to the [C]onstitution, is void.”).
108 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 68–69 (noting
that “[i]t is of the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative
authority,” and that “in a country seldom exposed . . . to internal invasions, . . . the people
are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed
to relaxation in favor of military exigencies . . . .”).
109 Id. at 69.
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the consequences of a society where people constantly need military protection:
The continual necessity for [the military’s] services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition
of the citizen. . . . The inhabitants of territories, often the theater of
war, are unavoidably subject to frequent infringements on their
rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their
protectors but as their superiors.110

Hamilton urged Americans to avoid the constant wars that
plagued Europe and made the military state superior to the civil
state.111 The Founders realized that the government could use
wartime hysteria as a pretext to violate citizens’ rights.112 By
drafting a written Constitution, the Founding Fathers sought to
prevent leaders from using wars to aggregate their own power at
the expense of constitutional rights.113
B. The Duty of Judges to Protect Constitutional Rights
The Founding Fathers left the protection of the Constitution
to federal judges, who have the duty to defend citizens’ rights despite political pressure.114 The Founders understood that in
times of hysteria, politically accountable legislators and executive
officials cannot protect unpopular constitutional principles.115
Hamilton argued that “it is easy to see that it would require an
uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as
faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community.”116 Federal judges were given lifetime tenure so that they
could protect citizens’ rights against oppressive legislation without fearing political pressure.117
The Founders also envisioned that the Court would challenge policies that restricted citizens’ rights during times of hys-

Id. at 70.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 56.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 67 (“The violent
destruction of life and property incident to war . . . will compel nations the most attached
to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy
their civil and political rights.”).
113 THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (John Jay), supra note 18, at 69 (“[I]n a country seldom
exposed . . . to internal invasions, . . . the people are in no danger of being broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to relaxation in favor of military exigencies . . . .”).
114 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 470.
117 Id. at 469.
110
111
112
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teria.118 They predicted situations where powerful interest
groups would deceive legislators into passing oppressive measures:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particular
conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves,
and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and
more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.119

The scenario Hamilton describes is strikingly similar to
Japanese-American internment during World War II, where
farmers competing with the Japanese fiercely lobbied Congress to
support the internment order.120 As Justice Murphy observed in
his Korematsu dissent, competing farmers had admitted that “[i]f
all the Japs were removed tomorrow, we’d never miss them in
two weeks, because the white farmers can take over and produce
everything the Jap grows.”121 The Founding Fathers realized
that politically accountable legislators and the President could
not defend unpopular groups’ constitutional rights against intense political pressure.122 They trusted independent, lifetimetenured judges to protect all citizens’ constitutional rights.123
III. THE IMPRACTICALITY OF RIGIDLY INTERPRETING THE
CONSTITUTION
Although the Founding Fathers believed that constitutional
rights should not be violated during wartime, they also wanted
the President to have sufficient power to protect national security.124 The Court can interpret the Constitution flexibly without
violating it to give the President sufficient power to defend the
country. By refusing to accommodate civil liberties to wartime
necessities, the Court does not give the President sufficient
power to defend the country. The Founding Fathers believed
118
119
120

ing).

Id.
Id. at 469.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 239 n.12 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissent-

Id. at 239 n.12 (internal quotation marks omitted).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 469–70.
Id. at 470–71 (“That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice,
can certainly not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission.”).
124 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423 (“Energy in
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to
the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”).
121
122
123
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that an important government objective was defending the nation against military attacks.125 While protecting constitutional
rights, the Court can still allow the President enough power to
defend national security.126
The Founding Fathers believed that the President should
have sufficient power to protect the country against foreign attacks.127 The Founders worried that a weak President would be
ineffective at quickly responding to national security dangers.128
As Hamilton observed, “[e]nergy in the executive is a leading
character in the definition of good government. . . . [and] is essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks.”129 During wars, the President should not be unduly restricted from acting decisively in conducting military
operations.130
Contrary to the Founders’ belief in presidential strength during wartime, the Court has sometimes rigidly interpreted the
Constitution in a manner that frustrates important military
measures. During the Civil War, for example, Justice Taney in
Ex parte Merryman refused to accommodate the President’s war
effort by compromising constitutional principles.131 John Merryman, a citizen residing in Baltimore, Maryland, was arrested for
aiding the Confederacy during the Civil War.132 He petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus, but the military commander refused to
honor it, arguing that he was authorized to suspend the writ by
President Lincoln.133 In Merryman, Justice Taney rejected
President Lincoln’s authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus without congressional approval:
With such provisions in the constitution, expressed in language
too clear to be misunderstood by any one, I can see no ground whatTHE FEDERALIST NO. 3 (John Jay), supra note 18, at 42.
Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary
to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the
first. . . .

125

At present I mean only to consider [safety] as it respects security for the
preservation of peace and tranquility, as well as against dangers from foreign
arms and influence.
Id. See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423.
126 See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2649–50 (2004) (“[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored
and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”).
127 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
132 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 20–21.
133 Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 148.
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ever for supposing that the [P]resident, in any emergency, or in any
state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus, or the arrest of a citizen, except in aid of the judicial power.134

Justice Taney argued that only Congress can suspend the
writ of habeas corpus because the power to suspend it is found in
Article I of the Constitution, which lists Congress’s powers.135 He
also cited Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ex parte Bollman
that “[i]f at any time, the public safety should require the suspension of the . . . [writ of habeas corpus], it is for the legislature
to say so.”136 Justice Taney believed that the President could not
suspend the writ of habeas corpus under any circumstances.137
Contrary to Justice Taney’s uncompromising opinion in Merryman, some scholars argue that the President has the constitutional power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus to defend
against a sudden attack.138 If Congress is not in session, the
President may need to act quickly to challenge an imminent national security danger. As Professor William F. Duker has observed, “Taney’s analysis was faulty in failing to acknowledge a
presidential power to suspend where essential to repel sudden
invasion.”139 Other scholars argue that during the Civil War, it
was debatable whether the President or Congress should suspend the writ of habeas corpus in emergencies.140 They contend
that President Lincoln should not be criticized for suspending the
writ of habeas corpus and for failing to honor John Merryman’s
habeas petition because Lincoln’s constitutional duty as Commander in Chief to protect the nation from an imminent invasion
outweighed the debatable procedural rule that only Congress
could suspend the writ of habeas corpus.141
Id. at 149.
Id. at 148 (“The clause of the constitution, which authorizes the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, is in the 9th section of the first article. This comment is devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the slightest reference to the executive department.”).
136 Id. at 152 (quoting Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 101 (1807)).
137 Id. at 149 (“I can see no ground whatever for supposing that the president, in any
emergency, or in any state of things, can authorize the suspension of the privileges of the
writ of habeas corpus . . . .”).
138 WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 147–48
(1980).
139 Id.
140 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 25 (“It would seem equally futile to argue over the
present location of this power, for it is a question on which fact and theory cannot be expected to concur.”).
141 Eli Palomares, Illegal Confinement: Presidential Authority to Suspend the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus During Times of Emergency, 12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
101, 119. The author writes: “An argument can be made that Lincoln’s first suspension of
the writ was legally justified under the President’s implied power to repel sudden attacks.” Id. at 118.
134
135
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Justice Taney unrealistically believed that the Constitution’s
provisions should not be interpreted flexibly during hardships
faced by the nation.142 As noted by Clinton Rossiter, Taney “considered himself the last barricade between the Constitution and
despotism.”143 After stating that he was sending a sealed copy of
his opinion to President Lincoln, Justice Taney then solemnly observed, “It will then remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of
his constitutional obligation to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed,’ to determine what measures he will take to cause
the civil process of the United States to be respected and enforced.”144
President Lincoln responded to Justice Taney by admitting
that he had an oath to act constitutionally, but argued that the
military danger justified his actions.145 In a speech before Congress on July 4, 1861, President Lincoln agreed with Taney that
“the attention of the country has been called to the proposition
that one who is sworn to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed should not himself violate them.”146 However, he defended his actions as essential to protecting the Union at a time
of threatened invasion: “[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the Government itself to go to pieces, lest that one be
violated?”147 President Lincoln felt that he was required to suspend the writ of habeas corpus without waiting for Congress because an imminent invasion by Confederate forces threatened
the nation, and he had a constitutional duty to protect the country.148
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 149.
Nor can any argument be drawn from the nature of sovereignty, or the necessity of government, for self-defence in times of tumult and danger. The government of the United States is one of delegated and limited powers; it derives
its existence and authority altogether from the constitution, and neither of its
branches, executive, legislative or judicial, can exercise any of the powers of
government beyond those specified and granted . . . .

142

Id.

ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 22.
Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153.
ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 24.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Gross, supra note 9, at 1015 (alteration in original).
ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 25 (“The law of the Constitution, as it actually exists,
must be considered to read that in a condition of martial necessity the President has the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.”). See also Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864). After President Lincoln refused to comply with
Justice Taney’s ruling in Ex parte Merryman, the Court was unsuccessful in protecting
even basic civil liberties during the Civil War. In Ex parte Vallandigham, Clement L.
Vallandigham was arrested for announcing to a crowd that he believed “that the present
war was a wicked, cruel, and unnecessary war, one not waged for the preservation of the
Union, but for the purposes of crushing out liberty and to erect a despotism . . . .” Id. at
244. He was arrested, charged with sympathizing with the Confederacy, and sentenced to
confinement for the duration of the war. The Supreme Court refused to hear the merits of
143
144
145
146
147
148
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IV. THE BALANCING TEST WITH BITE MODEL
This comment advocates the balancing test with bite model,
which the Court adopted in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.149 The balancing
test with bite model is most consistent with the Founding Fathers’ wishes because it secures essential roles for all three
branches of government during wartime.150 Unlike the deferential balancing model and the justiciability doctrines model, which
deferred to the President’s decisions with little scrutiny, the
Court in Hamdi recognized its constitutionally-mandated duty to
review presidential actions that threaten to deprive citizens of
their rights.151 The Court rejected the argument that exercising
judicial review will necessarily interfere with the military’s war
effort.152 Further, the Court demanded concrete evidence from
the President to support his detention of United States citizens,153 but accommodated the military’s wartime needs by lowering its evidentiary burden.154 However, in addition to protecting civil rights as mentioned above, the Court also validated the
holding in Ex parte Quirin, which gave the President extensive
power to conduct the war by detaining even American citizens
designated as enemy combatants.155 In doing so, it achieved a
critical balance between civil rights and presidential war powers.
A. The Court’s Recognition of Its Duty to Protect Rights
By recognizing its duty to protect constitutional rights, the
Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld complied with the Founders’ demand that all three branches of government have active roles at
all times.156 The Supreme Court refused to defer to the military
commanders’ designation of enemy combatant status without in-

Vallandigham’s case, explaining that it lacked jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of
1789 to originate a writ of certiorari to review the proceedings of a military commission.
Id. at 251–52.
149 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2647 (2004).
150 Id. at 2650 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are
at stake.”).
151 Id. (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”).
152 Id. at 2649 (“[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to
exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and
resolving claims like those presented here.”).
153 Id. at 2651 (“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”).
154 Id. at 2649 (“[E]nemy combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their
uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”).
155 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942).
156 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2650 (2004).
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specting its reasonableness.157 The Court observed that a true
balancing test must preserve a role for the Court’s protection of
civil liberties: “Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or
with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties
are at stake.”158
Like the Founding Fathers, who believed that judges should
protect constitutional rights against government infringements
in times of war and hysteria, the Court recognized its duty to review the constitutionality of wartime policies.159
The Court rejected the reasoning in Hirabayashi v. United
States that challenging military decisions would compromise the
war effort.160 In Hirabayshi, the Court observed:
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of
judgment and discretion and for the choice of means by those
branches of the Government on which the Constitution has placed the
responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review of
the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.161

The Court in Hirabayashi assumed that providing hearings
for 70,000 Japanese-American citizens to prove their loyalty
would be unduly time-consuming and administratively burdensome.162 However, England showed that administering due process proceedings for residents was not too difficult.163 As Clinton
Rossiter observes, “the English in 1940 had examined 74,000 enemy aliens individually . . . [while] Americans in 1942 had declined to make any attempt to separate the loyal from the disMere
loyal in the Japanese-American population.”164
administrative inconvenience is not a valid reason for the government to violate citizens’ fundamental constitutional rights.165
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld shows that courts still fear that their exercise of judicial review will harm the military’s efforts.166 Arguing that
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943).
Id.
Id. at 99 (“[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population, whose number
and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”).
163 ROSSITER, supra note 62, at 50–51.
164 Id.
165 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting)
(“Any inconvenience that may have accompanied an attempt to conform to procedural due
process cannot be said to justify violations of constitutional rights of individuals.”).
166 [Hamdi I], 316 F.3d 450, 471 (4th Cir. 2003).
157
158
159
160
161
162
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Hamdi’s detention should be upheld under a “some evidence”
standard, the government presented an affidavit from Michael
Mobbs, the Special Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, as evidence of Hamdi’s affiliation with the Taliban.167 The
district court “criticized the generic and hearsay nature of the affidavit, calling it ‘little more than the government’s “say-so.”’”168
However, the Fourth Circuit accepted the Mobbs declaration as
sufficient evidence. The Fourth Circuit stated: “For the judicial
branch to trespass upon the exercise of the warmaking powers
would be an infringement of the right to self-determination and
self-governance at a time when the care of the common defense is
most critical.”169
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that reviewing the government’s allegations would unduly burden the military.170 The
court argued that the military would compromise its wartime objectives by having to collect evidence to prove enemy combatant
status.171 Furthermore, it argued that courts would have difficulty judging the accuracy of military procedures in distant battle zones.172
B. The Court’s Modification of Evidentiary Requirements
In addition to recognizing its duty to protect constitutional
rights, the Court in Hamdi demanded concrete evidence to support the government’s detention of American citizens, but lowered its evidentiary standards.173 The Supreme Court required
that a prisoner have an opportunity to rebut the government’s allegations: “Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly unchallenged or are simply presumed correct
without any opportunity for the alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”174
The Court ruled that the Due Process Clause requires that
detained citizens have an opportunity to present evidence chal-

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld [Hamdi II], 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636–37 (2004).
Id. at 2637.
Hamdi I, 316 F.3d at 463.
Id. at 473–74.
Id. at 470 (“[L]itigation cannot be the driving force in effectuating and recording
wartime detentions. The military has been charged . . . with winning a war, not prevailing in a possible court case.”).
172 Id. at 474 (“Article III courts are ill-positioned to police the military’s distinction
between those in the arena of combat who should be detained and those who should not.”).
173 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2648, 2649 (“[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his
classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker.”).
174 Id. at 2651.
167
168
169
170
171
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lenging the government’s accusation of disloyalty.175 It refused to
defer to the government’s evidence without reviewing its reasonableness.176
Although the Court required the government to provide evidence to support citizen detentions, it also gave the government
significant power to prosecute the war by lowering evidentiary
standards.177 The Court observed that a citizen’s due process
rights must be weighed against the government’s interests in
protecting national security secrets and preventing prisoners
from returning to the battlefield.178 The Court ruled that lowered
evidentiary requirements in court proceedings are constitutional:
Hearsay, for example, may need to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government in such a proceeding.
Likewise, the Constitution would not be offended by a presumption in
favor of the Government’s evidence, so long as that presumption remained a rebuttable one and fair opportunity for rebuttal were provided.179

Furthermore, a prisoner can be tried by a military tribunal,
as long as proper due process protections are implemented.180
The Court also trusted lower federal courts to balance citizens’
constitutional rights with the military’s need to protect national
security secrets.181 Despite its presumption in favor of the government’s evidence, the Court protected the foundation of due
process: a person’s right to be heard by a neutral decision-maker
and to rebut allegations made against him.182
As the Court explained in Hamdi, a federal district court can
implement procedures that protect both constitutional rights and

175 Id. at 2649. “It is equally fundamental that the right to notice and an opportunity
to be heard ‘must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’ These
essential constitutional promises may not be eroded.” Id. (quoting Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972)).
176 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2650 (“[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion
that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts
in such circumstances.”).
177 Id. at 2649.
178 Id. at 2647 (“We reaffirm today . . . a citizen’s right to be free from involuntary
confinement . . . and we weigh the opposing governmental interests . . . . in ensuring that
those who have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against
the United States.”).
179 Id. at 2649.
180 Id. at 2651.
181 Id. at 2652 (“We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with these sensitive
matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that might arise in
an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties
that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”).
182 Id. at 2648. See also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (“The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.’”).
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national security secrets.183 The Court reasoned that “arguments
that military officers ought not have to wage war under the
threat of litigation lose much of their steam when factual disputes at enemy-combatant hearings are limited to the alleged
combatant’s acts.”184
As Professor John Yoo has observed, like surveillance courts,
federal courts can modify judicial procedures to accommodate national security concerns.185 In 1978, Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which established Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Courts (FISC) composed of federal
district court judges who can issue search warrants upon probable cause that the government is targeting a foreign power.186
Yoo explains that “FISA proceedings are held ex parte, with only
the government represented, in a closed hearing so that classified
information can be discussed with the judges while protecting intelligence sources and methods.”187 Like FISA proceedings, federal habeas courts can ensure that citizens’ due process rights
are protected by a neutral decision-maker while also protecting
national security secrets during wartime.188
C. The Court’s Respect for the President’s Power
Although the Supreme Court protected constitutional rights
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, it also recognized the President’s power to
defend national security.189 The Court reaffirmed the holding in
Ex parte Quirin, which allows the President to detain enemy
combatants during a war, even if the enemy combatant is an
American citizen.190 In Ex parte Quirin, decided by the Court in
1942 during World War II, eight Germans used submarines to
reach the United States.191 They carried explosives and planned
to destroy war facilities in the U.S. for the German government.192 After they were captured, President Roosevelt signed a
183 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2652 (“We have no reason to doubt that courts faced with
these sensitive matters will pay proper heed both to the matters of national security that
might arise in an individual case and to the constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties that remain vibrant even in times of security concerns.”).
184 Id. at 2649.
185 Yoo, supra note 52, at 442.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Hamdi II, 124 S. Ct. at 2652.
189 Id. at 2647 (“[O]ur Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically accountable
for making them.”).
190 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent
does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in
violation of the law of war.”).
191 Id. at 21.
192 Id.
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proclamation declaring that anybody attempting to enter the
United States to commit war acts would be “subject to the law of
war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals.”193 The captured individuals, one of whom claimed to be an American citizen, challenged the President’s authority to establish military
tribunals and argued that they had to be tried in civil courts by
juries.194
The Court in Quirin distinguished between lawful combatants and unlawful combatants under the law of war.195 The main
distinction between a lawful combatant and an unlawful combatant is that the latter does not wear a uniform.196 Spies and terrorists are commonly classified as unlawful combatants, i.e.,
“those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy
territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for
the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or
property.”197
The Court ruled that captured individuals who do not wear a
uniform while aiding enemy forces are subject to military tribunals, not civil courts.198 Furthermore, the Court declared that
the citizenship of one of the prisoners did not entitle him to a
civil trial by jury.199 It observed, “Citizenship in the United
States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful because in violation of the law of war.”200 The Court ruled that the President’s
power to detain enemy combatants so that they do not return to
the battlefield is an essential war power.201
The Court’s opinion in Quirin modified but did not overturn
the ruling in Ex parte Milligan that “[m]artial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.”202 In Hamdi, the Court
distinguished Quirin from Milligan by observing that in the latter case, the Court reasoned that Milligan was arrested at home
as a resident of Indiana, not as a prisoner of war:

Id. at 22–23 (quoting Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942)).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 30–31.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 31, 37.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 28–29 (“An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede
our military effort have violated the law of war.”).
202 See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
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Had Milligan been captured while he was assisting Confederate soldiers by carrying a rifle against Union troops on a Confederate battlefield, the holding of the Court might well have
been different. The Court’s repeated explanations that Milligan
was not a prisoner of war suggest that had these different circumstances been present he could have been detained under
military authority for the duration of the conflict, whether or not
he was a citizen.203
The Court in Hamdi showed that judicial review and military operations can function together.204 Once a captured prisoner is found to be an American citizen, he must be provided with
the due process rights detailed in Hamdi before a neutral decision-maker.205 However, if the tribunal confirms that the citizen
is indeed an enemy combatant, he may be detained for the duration of the war.206 The Court in Hamdi provided strong protection both for constitutional rights and for national security, proving that they are not mutually exclusive objectives.207
CONCLUSION
As evidenced by the World War II cases of Korematsu v.
United States208 and Hirabayashi v. United States,209 the Supreme Court has historically refrained from challenging the
President’s wartime actions.210 Using the deferential balancing
model, the Court in Korematsu deferred to the President’s constitutional interpretation to allow presidential actions that it would
normally find unconstitutional.211 Similarly, in Hirabayashi, the
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2642 (2004).
Id. at 2649–50.
Id. at 2648.
Id. at 2641, 2642.
Id. at 2647 (“We reaffirm today the fundamental nature of a citizen’s right to be
free from involuntary confinement by his own government without due process of law, and
we weigh the opposing governmental interests against the curtailment of liberty that such
confinement entails.”).
208 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
209 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
210 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (“[W]e cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal members of that population,
whose number and strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”).
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and
discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its
judgment for theirs.
Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93.
211 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 219–20.
Compulsory exclusion of large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic
governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern warfare our
203
204
205
206
207
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Court did not challenge the internment order against JapaneseAmericans.212 Instead, the Court used the justiciability doctrines
model to avoid hearing the merits of the internment order entirely.213
The Supreme Court should reject both the deferential balancing model and the justiciability doctrines model because they
are inconsistent with the Founding Fathers’ belief in constitutional absolutism.214 The Founders felt that the President and
Congress could not alter the Constitution’s provisions even during wartime.215 They expected the Supreme Court to recognize
its constitutionally-mandated duty to protect citizens’ constitutional rights from oppressive governmental actions.216 Although
the constitutional absolutism model is most consistent with the
Founders’ wishes, the Court has applied the model in ways contrary to their beliefs by overly restricting presidential power during wartime,217 instead of ensuring that the President had sufficient power to defend the country against foreign attacks.218
The balancing test with bite model advocated in this comment is most consistent with the Founding Fathers’ views because it provides all three branches with important wartime
roles.219 In applying the balancing test with bite model, the
shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger.
Id.

Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 85.
Since the sentences of three months each imposed by the district court on the
two counts were ordered to run concurrently, it will be unnecessary to consider
questions raised with respect to the first count [for violating the internment
order] if we find that the conviction on the second count, for violation of the
curfew order, must be sustained.

212

Id.

Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 470 (“Until the
people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established
form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no presumption, or even knowledge of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it prior to such an act.”).
215 Id. at 469.
[Y]et it is not to be inferred . . . that the representatives of the people, whenever a momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their constituents incompatible with the provisions in the existing Constitution would,
on that account, be justifiable in a violation of those provisions . . . .
Id.
216 Id. at 469 (“[T]he courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments . . . .”).
217 See, e.g., Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 151 (1861).
218 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 18, at 423 (“Energy in
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government. It is essential to
the protection of the community against foreign attacks . . . .”).
219 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“Whatever power the United States
Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with en213
214
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Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld recognized its duty to determine
whether the President’s actions are constitutional.220 The Court
also required the President to provide concrete evidence to support a citizen’s detention,221 but lowered the military’s evidentiary standard during wartime.222 Finally, the Court granted the
President extensive wartime power by reaffirming the holding in
Ex parte Quirin, which allows the President to detain even
American citizens designated as enemy combatants.223
The Court in Hamdi showed that courts can have vigorous
roles in protecting citizens’ rights during wartime.224 It seems
that the Court learned from the World War II cases that failing
to review presidential wartime actions can lead to tragic abuses
of citizens’ constitutional rights.225 During wars, the Court must
delicately balance the competing interests of protecting constitutional rights and allowing the President sufficient power to protect national security.226 However, it is essential to the system of
emy organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake.”).
220 Id. (“We have long since made clear that a state of war is not a blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”).
221 See id. at 537 (“Any process in which the Executive’s factual assertions go wholly
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the alleged
combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.”).
222 Id. at 533 (“[E]nemy-combatant proceedings may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”).
223 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37 (1942) (“Citizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not relieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is
unlawful because in violation of the law of war.”).
224 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (“[I]t does not infringe on the core role of the military for
the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”).
225 The Court cites Justice Murphy’s dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United
States, where he argued that the Court should examine the reasonableness of military
policies that impact citizens’ constitutional rights. Id. See also Mark Tushnet, Defending
Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273 (2003).
Tushnet argues that courts, along with the rest of society, undergo a process of social
learning. Tushnet explains the process as follows:
The government takes some action that its officials—and, frequently, the
courts—justify by invoking national security. In retrospect, once the wartime
emergency has passed, the actions, and their endorsement by the courts, come
to be seen as unjustified in fact (that is, by the facts as they actually existed
when the actions were taken). . . . The social learning is this: Knowing that
government officials in the past have in fact exaggerated threats to national
security or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to the threats
that actually were present, we have become increasingly skeptical about contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the scope of proposed government responses to threats has decreased.
Id. at 283–84.
226 See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533.
[A] citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy
combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral
decisionmaker. . . . At the same time, the exigencies of the circumstances may
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checks and balances underlying the American government that
the Court take a significant role in protecting citizens’ rights.

demand that, aside from these core elements, enemy-combatant proceedings
may be tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the Executive
at a time of ongoing military conflict.
Id.

